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  2Abstract 
 
Using a pooled sample, this paper indicates that unions seem to affect the 
economic performance of Brazilian establishments, especially in terms of 
profitability, employment and productivity. Unions tend to reduce profitability, 
whereas the relationship between union density and productivity, employment and 
average wages seems to be concave. These performance indicators first rise with 
union density up to a certain density level (usually about 50 percent) and then 
start to decline. These results indicate that some unionism may be good for the 
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  41. Introduction 
 
There have been many studies investigating the economic impact of unions in the economics 
literature.  These studies have examined the impact of union presence and density on economic 
performance and efficiency variables, measured at the plant, firm or industry level. The 
outcomes examined reflect either static performance, such as profitability and productivity, or 
dynamic efficiency, such as physical capital and R&D investments.  
In the U.S., for example, Mishel and Voos (1992) and Hirsh (1991) provide 
comprehensive surveys of the economic impact of unions, with the general finding that unions 
adversely affect economic performance. Menezes-Filho (1997) used panel data to find that 
unions have a negative impact on profitability in the United Kingdom, but that this effect 
declined over the 1980s, a period of harsh anti-union legislation. Moreover, Menezes-Filho, Ulph 
and Van Reenen (1998) found a negative correlation between unions and R&D spending in the 
United Kingdom, but this correlation basically disappeared when they controlled for cohort 
dummies and technological opportunities. Gregg, Machi and Metcalf  (1993) found that 
unionized firms experienced faster productivity growth in the U.K. in the late 1980s. Finally, 
Fallick and Hasset (1999) found that union certification significantly reduces a firm’s 
investment, whereas and Black and Lynch (1997) found that unionized establishments that have 
adopted new industrial relations practices have higher productivity than otherwise similar non-
union plants. 
In Latin America, there are very few econometric studies of the economic effect of 
unions.  This is very surprising, given their recognized importance in shaping various economic 
and political outcomes in these countries. There have been some studies examining the effect of 
unions on wages, such as Arbache (1999), who found that unions increase wage dispersion in 
Brazil, contrary to almost all studies in the developed world. This highlights the need for 
research on the effect of unions on firms’ economic performance in Latin America, so that the 
role of unions can be better understood and economic policies devised to improve the 
relationship between workers and managers.  
Brazil (like other Latin American countries) has recently been subject to a dramatic trade 
liberalization process, with trade tariffs declining from an average of 57.5 percent in 1988 to 
about 15.6 percent in 1998.  The literature on unions and international trade shows that 
increasing imports and the removal of trade barriers may have a negative impact on union wages 
  5(see Driffill and Van der Poeg, 1995 and Gaston and Tefler, 1995). One important research and 
policy question that can also be addressed with this research is what happened to the union 
impact on the firms’ economic performance after the rapid trade liberalization process, which 
brought more competition to the market. 
To anticipate the results, this paper indicates that unions seem to affect the economic 
performance of Brazilian establishments, especially in terms of profitability, employment and 
productivity. The results using the pooled sample indicate that unions tend to reduce 
profitability, whereas the relationship between union density and productivity, employment and 
average wages seems to be concave. These performance indicators first rise with union density 
up to a certain density level (usually about 50 percent) and then start to decline. These results 
indicate that some unionism may be good for the plants’ economic performance, although too 
much unionism may start having negative effects. 
 
2.  A Brief History of Union Activity in Brazil 
 
The main hypothesis that this paper will investigate is whether trade unions have had a negative 
impact on the economic performance of Brazilian firms, measured in terms of profitability, 
productivity and capital investment. The paper also seeks to examine the conjecture that changes 
in Brazilian trade policy in the early 1990s, which increased competition in the product market, 
affected the power of trade unions to affect these measures.  
The data available seem adequate to test these hypotheses, since information was 
collected on many economic variables at the establishment level over time and establishments 
were surveyed on unionization and other industrial relations policies throughout the 1990s. It 
was therefore possible to summarize the main changes that occurred in the industrial relations 
policies of the firms in the sample and relate those changes in the competitive environment and 
to the division of rents inside each firm. 
Brazil is one of the few countries that have not signed Convention 87 of the ILO. This 
Convention is regarded as the most important by the ILO, as it establishes the principle of 
freedom to organize. According to it, workers are entitled to decide on matters of union 
organization and structure without any interference from the other actors in the system. In 
particular, under the principle of freedom to organize, workers are the ones who should decide if 
the union structure should either be unified by one single union, or organized with more than one 
  6organization. In Brazil, the structure of workers’ representation is a matter of law and of the 
Constitution. Since the matter is regulated by the law and by the Constitution, Brazilian workers 
do not have the freedom to organize unions of their own. In order for Brazil to become a 
signatory of Convention 87, the country’s Constitution would need to be changed, at least in this 
respect. 
Until 1988, the Labor Code was very restrictive about union organization in Brazil. 
Unions were subject to interference and even to intervention by the government. The law 
restricted the size of the union board of directors, limiting it to 25 members. To exist, the union 
needed a formal authorization from the Labor Secretary, known as the “Union Letter” (Carta 
Sindical). Unions could organize workers belonging to “categories,” as they were defined in the 
law. If a “category” was not listed in the Labor Code, there could not exist a union to represent 
these workers. The law has never recognized the right to organize and to represent workers at the 
plant level. The smallest representing unit is the city, and, consequently, the smallest bargaining 
unit is supposed to be the city, too. 
Together with restrictions on union activities, the law also conceded some rights to the 
unions. The most important is exclusive jurisdiction. Once recognized by the government, the 
union becomes the single representative of the workers. In addition, the law created the “Union 
Tax,” a compulsory fee deducted from the pay of all workers belonging to the “category,” even 
non-members. The “Union Tax” corresponds to the value of one day’s work and is deducted 
annually, in March. The revenue is distributed in the following proportions: 60 percent to the 
local (city) union, 15 percent to the state federation, 5 percent to the national confederation, and 
20 percent to the Labor Department. 
Brazilian Labor law complemented union regulation by offering some personal 
opportunities to union officers. For instance, within the Labor Department, there were many tri-
partite structures in which some positions were reserved for labor union officers. The Labor 
Court system was also a tripartite structure, with hundreds of positions to be filled. The 
appointment decisions to the positions were the outcomes of political processes and were used by 
governments as a means of co-opting labor leaders. With this legal apparatus, the government 
has been able to control the labor movement since the 1930s. Repression and co-optation were 
combined for decades, to allow the industrialization of the country with minimal industrial 
conflict. In this sense, the model may be regarded as a success. 
  7The 1988 Constitution changed some of the old provisions, and created a situation similar 
to that prevailing in the United States and Canada. On the one hand, the 1978 Constitution 
eliminated all forms of government interference and intervention in union affairs. On the other 
hand, it retained the monopoly of representation, with the single union principle. It also kept the 
“Union Contribution” and created a second compulsory contribution, whose value is to be 
decided by the “workers’ assembly,” organized by the union. 
After 1988, union representation became a Constitutional matter. The old problems of 
lack of legitimacy were not solved. The old system was repressive, but it was consistent, 
combining elements of restrictions with some compensating privileges. The system that has 
emerged from the new Constitution, however, is very ambiguous. Unions have achieved more 
freedom, since they are not subject to government intervention. However, rather than assuming 
risks and responsibilities which should come with freedom, unions have managed to keep the old 
privileges. As a result, today, Brazilian unions have the legal guarantee of monopolistic 
representation, and, at the same time, have the right to collect compulsory fees. They are free to 
define “categories” of workers but cannot represent at the plant level. 
  The union structure that has emerged from the 1988 Constitution is very curious. 
Because of the maintenance of both the “Union Contribution” and the union monopoly, there are 
many incentives to create new unions. At the same time, however, union officers are still 
relatively insulated from rank-and-file pressures to represent workers’ interests. Figures of the 
Brazilian Labor Department indicate that there are about 18,000 unions in the country. It would 
not be correct to say that all are led by non-representative, illegitimate officers. In fact, there is 
an important part of the Brazilian labor movement, within CUT (the largest peak organization), 
which advocates the signing of Convention 87. Some Brazilian unions give back to the workers 
they represent the fees collected by the Government (the “Union Contribution”). Some unions 
fight to establish formal representation at the plant level, through Works Councils, and to 
establish direct negotiations with management. 
In sum, all Brazilian workers working in formally organized firms, are formally 
represented by a trade union. The union engages in collective bargaining at least once a year. 
Bargaining outcomes are automatically extended to all workers in the industry, regardless of the 
membership status of individual workers. This means that, for instance, wage increases 
negotiated at the bargaining table, apply to all workers in the industry, even to non-members. 
  8Moreover, all workers in a firm are entitled to the wage increase, even if there are no union 
members within the firm’s labor force.  
However, trade unions do negotiate, on a firm-by-firm and even plant-by-plant basis, 
about working conditions and practices, employment levels, shifts, introduction of new 
machinery, etc. Therefore, this paper tests the hypothesis that the wages and practices defined at 
the industry level act as a floor (outside option) for the workers’ demands within a firm, and that 
a second-round bargaining process takes place within each establishment, that will affect various 
performance measures, depending on the relative bargaining power of its workers. This 
bargaining power depends on the presence of unionized workers and of a workers’ council in the 
firm, and also on whether the firm recognizes the union for bargaining purposes.  
The period covered by the data used in this study is 1990-2000. As mentioned before, the 
legal framework that regulates union activity in Brazil was reformed in 1988, with the new 
Constitution, and has not changed during the period. Consequently, variations in union effects, 
eventually captured, cannot be attributed to changes in the legal and institutional framework. 
They should be related to other structural changes, mainly to the economic reforms initiated in 
the Collor Administration, since 1990. 
   In the 1990s, with Presidents Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil 
started a process of opening its domestic markets, restructured many industries, privatized state-
owned enterprises, deregulated some industries, and transferred to the private sector many 
services that had previously been performed by the state.
1 Thus, in the period under study, there 
were a number of important changes in the Brazilian markets of goods and services. The reforms 
have impacted the labor market, and very probably have changed the elasticity of demand of 
labor. Changes in union impacts should be attributed to those changes, rather to regulation of 
union activity. 
          In sum, trade unions have played a very important role in the Brazilian society, especially 
in recent times, since the democratization process that took place in the early 1980s. Despite this 
important role played by unions in society, no econometric study has attempted to assess the 
impact of unions on static and dynamic efficiency. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
 
                                                           
1 For an overall view of privatization process that took place in Brazil, see Annex 2. 
 
  93.  Theory and Econometric Methodology 
 
3.1 Theoretical  Issues 
 
Models of union-firm bargaining are generally applications of a class of game theoretical models 
first described by Nash (1953). Bargaining models can be either static and axiomatic (as 
formulated by Nash, 1953), or dynamic and strategic (first analyzed by Rubinstein, 1982). 
Binmore (1982) describes the conditions under which the two types of models generate identical 
solutions. The differences and correspondences between these two types of models were also 
examined in details by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).  
 In order to describe a game, one needs to specify its form, the players’ preferences and 
strategies, and the status quo points. In the games to be examined in this project, the bargaining 
process takes place over time, consisting of a sequence of bargaining periods. At each point in 
time, one of the players suggests one agreement and the other can either accept or reject it. If the 
other player accepts the proposition, the game ends. If she rejects, the game goes on to the next 
bargaining period and it is now her turn to propose an agreement. The players’ strategies are 
sequences of rules that will govern the behavior of each player at each stage of the game, and 
that may or may not depend on the entire history of the game. 
      In order to fully describe the bargaining process, one has to specify the firm and 
union’s utility functions, the disagreement pay-offs of both parties and the scope of the 
bargaining. Bargaining can be over wages only (right-to-manage model), over wages and 
employment (efficient bargaining, see MacDonald and Solow, 1981) or over wages, employment 
and investment (see Grout, 1984). The division of rents and the equilibrium level of investment 
will depend on the union’s relative bargaining power and the disagreement pay-offs.  
 Some studies introduce competition in the product market, assuming that there are two 
firms and that each firm bargains over wages with the union representing its workers in the first 
stage. In the second stage, each firm sets its output and employment to maximize profits for a 
given wage level (the right to manage model). The product market competition (second stage) 
takes place only between the two firms (both produce a homogeneous product) and takes the 
form of a Cournot-Nash model (see Dowrick, 1992, Davidson, 1988, Dobson, 1994 and 
Menezes-Filho, 1997). 
 
  103.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
Based on the theoretical ideas and the data availability described above, our objective is to 
estimate simple panel data econometric models such as: 
 
                    Y it t it it it i it X n Competitio Union ε δ γ θ β α + + + + + =                                (1) 
 
where i indicates a firm observed in year t, Y is the dependent variable of interest (profitability, 
productivity, investment or wages),  i α is the unobserved firm fixed effect, Union is a proxy for 
union power (e.g., union density), Competition proxies for local and foreign product market 
competition, and the vector X represents econometric controls potentially correlated with 
unionization and with performance indicators, such as market share.  
If the coefficient on unionism is found to affect wages, investment, productivity and/or 
profitability, this would give empirical support for the proposition, described in the sub-section 
above, that the division of rents and the equilibrium level of investment of a firm will depend on 
the union’s relative bargaining power.  
As panel data is available, there are many possible estimation strategies. First, the data 
over the years will be pooled and simple Ordinary Least Squares models will be estimated. The 
aim is to have an idea of the size of the union impact on different indicators of economic 
performance in Brazil and compare them with available estimates in the developed and less 
developed world. The sample will then be split and separate regressions run for the periods 
before and after trade liberalization, to check whether the coefficient on union density is stable 
over time. Finally, it would be very interesting to interact the union variable with product market 
competition, to check whether the union impact varies with the degree of monopoly power 
enjoyed by the firm (see Stewart, 1993). 
In a second stage, time-varying (retrospective) information on union density, together 
with the firm level performance variables, will be used to estimate equation (1) in first-
differences, to eliminate the unobserved firm level heterogeneity that is constant over time. This 
is intended to check whether the union impact estimated using the pooled sample is biased due to 
omitted variables that are constant over time.  It is also desirable to run separate first-differences 
equations for the beginning and end of the decade to test for temporal parameter stability.  
  11Finally, information on new industrial relations practices, also gathered by the survey, 
will be used to check whether the introduction of these practices have improved efficiency and 
whether their effect on performance differed according to union status. 
 
4.  The Data 
 
4.1 Annual Industrial Survey – PIA 
 
The data used in this paper come from two different sources. The first source is a firm-level 
survey, the “Pesquisa Industrial Anual” (Annual Industrial Survey), conducted every year from 
1988 to 1998 by the Brazilian Census Bureau. (For budgetary reasons no survey was conducted 
in 1991.) The survey covers a sample of firms operating in the manufacturing sector of the 
economy. The average number of firms is 10,000 per year, and the sample structure is as 
follows: 
i)  all firms with more than 1,000 employees were surveyed; 
ii)  a random sample of firms with less than 1,000 were surveyed. 
The variables to be used from the surveys are: Payroll, Fringe Benefits, Sales Revenue, 
Cost of Raw Materials and Energy, Value Added, Investments in Machines, Plants and 
Buildings, Number of Employees and Capital Stock. With these variables the following 
performance indicators were constructed: 
•  Profitability = ((Sales Revenue – Wages and Salaries – Fringe Benefits – Raw 
Materials)/Sales Revenue) 
•  Productivity = log (Value  Added  (Sales Revenue – Cost of Raw Materials – Capital 
Depreciation – Energy and other inputs)/ Employment (Number of Employees)) 
•  Investment Rate = (Investments in Machines/Capital Stock) 
•  Employment Level = log (Number of Employees)  
•  Average Wages = log (Amount paid in Annual Wages)/ total number of employees) 
 
4.2  Union Survey  
 
Unfortunately, there is no information on unionism in the Industrial Surveys. Therefore, as in 
Menezes-Filho (1997) and Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998), a retrospective survey 
was carried out survey among the manufacturing firms, seeking information about the present 
  12and past union status of the workforce, as well as proxies for the strength of the union’s 
bargaining power and new industrial relation policies. The firms were also asked about the 
degree of competition that they face, both internally and from abroad, now and during the trade 
liberalization process. A copy of the questionnaire is included in the Annex.  
About 1,100 manufacturing plants from different regions were surveyed, mainly of 
medium to large size in terms of employment, from a mailing list available at FIPE-USP. The 
information from this industrial relations survey was then matched to the data from the industrial 
surveys (PIA). The interviews were conducted by telephone, which guaranteed a high response 
rate; in fact, the response rate was 95 representing 946 establishments. Of those plants, 650 were 
matched to the Industrial Surveys conducted by IBGE.   
Unfortunately, when the sample is restricted to those establishments with valid 
information on the main variables for at least four consecutive years, the total dropped to 285 
establishments, which will be the sample size from now on.  Moreover, there was a change in the 
PIA methodology in 1996, so that many firms that were surveyed before 1996 were not followed 
afterwards and new firms were included from 1996. In order to maximize the information on the 
time dimension, the sample was restricted to those firms that were observed before and after the 
change.  However, some robustness tests using the whole sample were conducted, and the results 
will be reported where pertinent.  
Table 1a presents the number of establishments surveyed every year and Table 1b the 
balance of the panel. One can see that the number of establishments is reasonably constant over 
time and the most plants are followed for 9 or 10 years, that is, almost the whole period.  
 
Table 1a. Sample Size 
 
Years  88 89 89 92 93 94 95 96 97 98  Total
Establishments  232 227 234 262 263 279 268 276 221 275  2537
 
 
    
Table 1b. Balance of the Panel 
 
Years  4 5 6 7 8 9  10  Total 
Establishments  13 13 10 23 11 69  149  288 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics   
 
Years Employment Real  Wage







(% Revenue)  















































































































 Source: PIA-IBGE.  
Notes: For definitions of the variables, see text. Total number of observations is 2,437.  Numbers in  
italics are for the balanced panel, 1,410 obs. 
 
 
          Table 2 describes the main variables to be used in the empirical exercises. The data in the 
sample accord well with the stylized facts of the Brazilian economy in the 1980s and 1990s. 
  14Employment suffered a drastic reduction between 1990 and 1992,
2 although it is still a matter of 
debate whether this was due to the trade liberalization process or to the deep recession that took 
place in 1991 and 1992. The further reduction between 1996 and 1998 could be due to sample 
selection, as many firms dropped out of the sample by 1995, when there was a change in PIA 
methodology (see above).   Real wages were largely stable between 1988 and 1994, rising 
continuously afterwards. Productivity rose abruptly between 1990 and 1992, remaining 
somewhat constant between 1992 and 1998.
 The fact that labor productivity falls in most typical 
recessions suggests that the rise in productivity between 1990 and 1992 was driven by trade 
liberalization.
3 Investment fluctuated a great deal over the period, whereas mark-ups rose quite a 
lot between 1990 and 1992, but were reduced after 1994. The figures in brackets refer to the 
balanced panel, and they show that the figures are not qualitatively different, so that they are not 
driven by changes in the sample composition. 
Table 3 tabulates the results of the survey in terms of union presence and importance over 
our sample period. About half of the establishments have less than 25 percent of their workforce 
unionized, with the other half roughly equally divided among the other quartiles of union 
density. There is consequently enough variation in union density to attempt to identify its effects 
on economic performance.  
  With respect to changes over time, it is also the case that many firms experienced 
changes in union density among their employees, with 10 percent reporting a rise in union 
density between 1995 and 2000, 58 percent reporting stability and 32 percent reporting a 
reduction. The numbers in 1990 and 1995 are approximately the same, which raises suspicions of 
measurement errors in the answers for this period.  In terms of union recognition, about 81 
percent of establishments recognized unions for bargaining purposes in 2000, and this percentage 
was roughly constant over time. Finally, only about 24 percent of plants reported the presence of 
union representatives in their workforce, and this percentage varies very little over time. As 
plants did not report many changes in union recognition or the presence of a workers’ council 
over time, identification of the long-differences specification will have to rely on the changes in 
union density. 
 
                                                           
2 As noted above, for budgetary reasons no survey was conducted in 1991. 
3 We thank Peter Kuhn for pointing this out to us. 
  15Table 3. Description of Union Variables 
 
Plant Union Density 
Density – 2000   
Den<=25%   50% 
25%<Den<=50% 23% 
Changes in Union Density over time 
50%<Den<=75% 13%  ↑ 90-95 = 90-95  ↓ 90-95  ↑ 95-00  = 95-00  ↓ 95-00 
Den > 75%  14%  11%  61%  28%  10%  58%  32% 
Union Recognition 
Level – 2000  Changes in Union Recognition over Time 
NO YES  ↑ 90-95  = 90-95  ↓ 90-95  ↑ 95-00  = 95-00  ↓ 95-00 
19% 81%  1%  98%  1%  1%  98%  1% 
Workers Council 
Level – 2000  Change in the Presence of a Workers Council over Time 
NO YES  ↑ 90-95  = 90-95  ↓ 90-95  ↑ 95-00  = 95-00  ↓ 95-00 
76% 24%  3%  96%  1%  4%  94%  2% 
   Number of firms = 288. 
 
 
Table 4 compares the means of the economic variables described above in more and less 
unionized establishments. In terms of employment, average wages and capital investments, one 
can note that there is a non-linear (concave) relationship between these variables and the 
percentage of workers that are unionized in 2000.
4  All of them rise with unionization up to 
certain level, decreasing afterwards. With respect to productivity and profitability, one can note a 
continuous decline with unionization.  In terms of union recognition, all performance measures, 
except for capital investments, are lower in establishments that explicitly bargain with trade 
unions. The presence of a workers’ council, on the other hand, is associated with more 
employment, wages and capital investments, but with lower mark-up and productivity. 
 
                                                           
4 It should be noted that this level of unionization is an end of period measure and the level of unionization has 
changed over the sample period, as Table 2 makes clear.  










Density            
Den≤ 25%  608 783 63,844 3.37  0.36  1,254 
25%>Den≤50%  1,236 991  57,005  8.48  0.34  581 
50%>Den<=75% 1,169  886  49,337  8.29 0.31  338 
Den>75% 911  696  46,193  3.23  0.29  364 
Recognition            
No 871  978  66,741  5.32  0.38  487 
Yes 870  797  55,692  5.36  0.33  2,050 
Workers’ 
Council 
          
No 
 
747 820 59,832 4.56  0.34  1,913 
Yes 1,246  869  51,621  7.79  0.34  624 
Source: Pesquisa Industrial Anual, PIA-IBGE.  
 
5. The Results 
 
5.1 Pooled Sample 
 
Moving on to the regressions,
5 Table 5 presents the results of the levels regressions, using the 
1988 to 1998 pooled data. All models were estimated using a random effects model that takes 
into account the presence of serial correlation induced by persistent firm-specific effects.
6 In the 
first column, the results of using profitability or mark-up as the dependent variable are set forth. 
First, it seems that union density is negatively associated with profitability, even after controls 
are allowed for market share, market concentration,
7 employment, capital intensity and 22 sector 
dummies. The estimated coefficient implies an elasticity, evaluated at mean profitability and 
                                                           
5 The results of these regressions should perhaps be better interpreted as conditional correlations, since no controls 
are allowed for firm fixed effects or other endogeneity issues. The industry fixed effect is included, however.  
6 For long-differences specifications that control for fixed effects, see below. 
7 The concentration measure we use is based on our survey. The managers were asked whether they face more or 
fewer than five competitors in their market (see Annex).  
  17density, of about -0.06. It is interesting to note that both market share and market concentration 
positively impact profitability, suggesting the importance of efficiency and market power in the 
Brazilian industry.  
 
Table 5. Levels Regressions, 1988-1998 
 
Controls Profitability  Employment Investment  Value 
Added 
Wages 
          
-0.063* 0.392** -0.020  -0.315**  0.120  Union Density 
(0.032) (0.141)  (0.042)  (0.138)  (0.082) 
0.812** 8.068*  0.067  8.093**  3.370**  Market Share 
(0.247) (0.810)  (0.439)  (0.986)  (0.406) 
0.037* 0.037  -0.054**  0.045  0.035  Concentration 
(0.019) (0.087)  (0.026)  (0.085)  (0.051) 
-0.013** -0.047**  -    -0.011  Capital /Sales 
(0.002) (0.004)      (0.003) 
-0.010 -  -0.008  0.779**  0.881**  Ln(employment) 
(0.008)   (0.015)  (0.034)  (0.013) 
Ln (capital)  - -  -  0.110**  - 
       (0.024)   
Mark-up  - -  0.061**  -  - 
     (0.014)     
Observations = 2529 ;  Number of groups = 288 
Industry Dummies: yes 
Time Dummies: yes        
Source: PIA-IBGE. 
  Note: Random Effects Regression. Standard Errors in brackets.  
 
 In terms of employment, a positive and significant coefficient is reported in column (2), 
which implies an elasticity of 0.13, suggesting the unionized plants employ more people, even 
conditional on the industry in which they operate, their market share, concentration and capital 
intensity. It appears from the results in column (3) that unions do not affect the plants’ 
investment decisions. The only impact that was precisely measured in the investment equation 
  18was a negative market concentration, which suggests that market power is not very good for 
growth.   
In terms of value added, the results indicate that more unionized plants produce less 
output, with the same levels of employment and capital, than less unionized ones. The elasticity 
is -0.11, at mean density, which is a significant number. It is also interesting to note that market 
share has a positive and substantial impact on productivity, but that concentration does not, 
implying a cost-based interpretation for the market share effect. In terms of average wages, the 
impact of union density is positive but not significant at conventional levels.  It is interesting to 
point out, however, that both market share and employment have positive and significant 
estimated coefficients in the wage equations. This provides evidence of a non-competitive wage 
determination process, in particular of rent-sharing. 
The models so far imposed the restriction that the relationship between unionization and 
performance is linear (or log-linear), but both the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4 and 
the results of Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (2000) suggest a non-linear relationship 
between union density and the performance indicators. Table 6 therefore includes union density 
squared as an additional explanatory variable in all the models estimated in Table 5.
8  
 
Table 6. Levels Regressions, Non-linear Density, 1988-1998 
 
Controls Profitability  Employment Investment  Value 
Added 
Wages 
          
Density -0.032  1.889**  -0.021  0.836*  1.262** 
  (0.110) (0.485) (0.147)  (0.437)  (0.288) 
Density Squared  -0.013 -1.580** -0.005  -1.200**  -1.253** 
  (0.115) (0.510) (0.154)  (0.501)  (0.302) 
Share  0.824** 7.997**  0.043  7.956**  3.289** 
 
(0.246) (0.609) (0.440)  (0.986)  (0.405) 
Concentration  0.037 0.001  -0.052**  0.038  0.015 
 
(0.019) (0.085) (0.026)  (0.085)  (0.050) 
Capital /Sales  -0.013 -0.046**  -  - -0.011 
 
(0.002) (0.004)     (0.003) 
                                                           
8 It is important to note that two indicators of change in union density were included in all columns. 
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Controls Profitability  Employment Investment  Value 
Added 
Wages 
Ln(employment)  -0.011 - -0.006  0.775**  0.876** 
  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.034)  (0.013) 
Ln (capital)  - - -  0.107**  - 
      (0.024)   
Mark-up  - -  0.060  -  - 
     (0.047)     
Observations = 2,529 ;  Number of groups = 288 
Industry Dummies: yes 
Time Dummies: yes        
Source: PIA-IBGE.  
Notes: Random Effects GLS Regression. Standard Errors in brackets.  All columns include indicators 
of change in union density between 1988-1998. 
                     
The results of the random effects specifications show that, in general, the linear 
restriction does not seem to fit well with the data. The exception to this rule is the profitability 
equation, where the inclusion of density squared inflated the standard errors, because of 
multicollinearity, without adding more information to the specification.  It seems therefore, that 
more unionized plants tend to have lower profits, period. 
In term of employment however, Table 6 shows clearly that employment grows only up 
to a certain level of unionization, thereafter declining. Employment reaches a maximum when 
union density reaches 60 percent, with about 24 percent of plants having densities higher than 
that.  In terms of investment, the results remain the same as in the linear case, that is, with no 
union effects on growth. The results using value added as a dependent variable are quite 
significant, however.  The relation seems to be concave, with the marginal impact reaching its 
maximum at mean union density (34 percent). In establishments where more than 80 percent of 
the workers belong to a trade union, productivity is actually lower than in non-unionized ones. A 
similar phenomenon happens with average wages, but the impact reaches its maximum when 
half of the plant’s workforce is unionized and it never leads to lower wages than in non-
unionized settings. 
  20The results as a whole imply that unionism always reduces profitability, that is, the share 
of total sales that goes to shareholders or is re-invested. However, some unionism is actually 
good for the plants’ performance in terms of value added, and it also leads to increases in wages 
and employment. When union density reaches about 35 percent of the plant’s workforce, the 
impact in terms of productivity starts to reverse, and after 50 percent of employees are unionized, 
further rises in unionism lead to lower employment and wages. If wages and employment depend 
on the plant’s performance, the presence of trade unions may facilitate communication between 
workers and managers, increasing efficiency and productivity, which translate into higher 
compensation and job security. However, when unions have too much power, they seem to 
impede progress and lead to the deterioration of all performance indicators. 
 
4.3  Union Effect over Time 
 
In a period of significant changes in the economic environment, as described above, it is 
important to test for the time stability of the estimated coefficients. To accomplish this, the data 
was grouped by periods and Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of the union density 
variable in OLS regressions using the various performance indicators as dependent variables.  It 
must be emphasized that union density as reported by managers in 2000 is used as the main 
independent variable in the regressions, but that controls are included for the plants whose 
managers report changes in density between 1990 and 2000. 
The grouping was chosen according to changes in the Brazilian economy. The period 
between 1988 and 1990 was a period of high inflation and slow growth. Moreover, trade 
liberalization, with a big reduction in trade tariffs, began in 1988. Between 1992 and 1994 
inflation reached its peak and the trade liberalization process was completed, and in 1994 the 
Real stabilization plan was implemented. Between 1995 and 1998, inflation was quite low and 
stable, a program of mass privatization was implemented and the economy was growing.  
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1988-90 Profitability  Employment  Investment  Value  Added  Wages 
-0.310** 1.676**  -0.152 0.209 1.224**  Density 
(0.138)  (0.336) (0.560) (0.367) (0.237)
0.279** -1.598**  0.101 -0.668*  -1.190**  Density2 
(0.136)  (0.350) (0.443) (0.392) (0.232)
1992-1994 
-0.232** 1.242**  0.001 -0.187 1.253**  Density 
(0.113)  (0.346) (0.050) (0.302) (0.194)
0.180* -1.017**  -0.005  -0.070  -1.256**  Density2 
(0.113)  (0.376) (0.053) (0.317) (0.197)
1995-98 
0.269** 2.224** -0.027  1.329**  0.802**  Density 
(0.086)  (0.272) (0.053) (0.475) (0.187)
-0.323** -2.045**  0.011  -1.790**  -0.819**  Density2 
(0.091)  (0.294) (0.055) (0.480) (0.199)
Industry Dummies: yes 
Time Dummies: yes 
Source: PIA-IBGE. 
Note:  Standard Errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) in brackets. All controls of Tables 5 to 9 are included in the 
regressions.  
 
Column (1) reports the results of the profitability regressions, which show that the 
estimated parameters behave differently across periods, especially before and after the Real 
stabilization plan (1994). Before that, rises in union density led to lower profitability, but this 
relationship was reversed when around half the workers in the establishments were unionized. 
After stabilization, the situation was turned around, with unionization first increasing, than 
decreasing the plants’ mark-ups. One possible explanation for these findings is that in periods of 
very high and growing inflation, the concept of relative prices lost most of its meaning and the 
distributive conflict between unions and managers could always be solved through price 
increases (see Amadeo and Pero, 2000). After 1994, profitability followed the behavior of other 
indicators, rising and then declining with unionization (see below). 
The behavior of the relationship between employment and unionization is quite stable 
over time, as column (2) shows. The intensity of this relationship varies somewhat, with the 
biggest effects after stabilization. In terms of investment, no effect was found in any of the sub-
  22periods. With respect to value added, a negative relationship with union density is noticeable 
before 1994, whereas after stabilization the non-linear pattern is evident.  Finally, the concave 
relationship between density and wages is evident in all periods, although a bit less intense in the 
final period. 
 
5.3 Long-Differences Equations 
 
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of regressions that use the change in union density
9 as an 
explanatory variable for changes in our performance measures over the same period. The aim of 
these exercises is to test the robustness of the results after the elimination of plant-specific 
effects.
10 The results of the profitability regressions for the 1995-1998 period (Table 8, first 
column) indicate that a decline in union density tends to raise mark-ups, though the effect is 
imprecisely estimated. In terms of employment, the result of the levels’ specification is 
reproduced, with a decline in density leading to a decline in employment. This is an important 
result, as it confirms that trade unions tend to increase employment in Brazil.
11   
  In terms of investment, once again no significant results were obtained, but declines in 
union density tend to increase productivity, and significantly so, as the results of the fifth column 
reveal. The relationship between wages and unionization all but vanishes in the long-differences 
specifications, which indicate that plant fixed effects might be contaminating the levels results. 
With respect to the other controls, it is noticeable that the positive (and significant) market share 
and employment coefficients in the wage equations indicate that these relationships are robust to 
fixed effects. 
 
                                                           
9 As reported by the manager that answered the survey. The omitted variable is “constant union density” throughout. 
10 It must be said at the outset that unions effects are notoriously difficult to captured in first-differences 
specifications (see Hirsh, 1991 and Bronars and Deere, 1990). 
11 Interactions between rise in density and density were with to capture non-linearities in the long-differences 
specifications, but with no significant results. 
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-0.004 0.094 0.027 0.321  0.002  Rise in 
Density  (0.054) (0.133) (0.039) (0.282)  (0.073) 
0.056 -0.202** 0.008 0.526**  -0.002  Decrease in 
Density  (0.040) (0.093) (0.024) (0.234)  (0.054) 
0.045 -0.021 -0.023 0.205  0.077  Rise in Local 
Competition  (0.075)  (0.223) (0.044) (0.208)  (0.093)
0.048 -0.003 -0.020 0.204  0.074  Constant local 
competition  (0.078)  (0.231) (0.048) (0.229)  (0.097)
0.187** 0.043  0.014  0.249  0.021  Rise in Foreign 
Competition  (0.062)  (0.139) (0.036) (0.227)  (0.095)
0.156** 0.117  0.020  0.387  0.071  Constant foreign 
Competition  (0.058)  (0.145) (0.039) (0.231)  (0.093)
0.233 6.836** 0.642  2.865  1.719*  ∆ Market Share 
(0.847)  (2.378) (0.634) (2.195)  (0.939)
0.024 - 0.019  0.997**  0.838**  ∆ Employment 
(0.030)  (0.018) (0.110)  (0.056)
-0.016 -0.078**  -  -  -0.027  ∆Capital/Sales 
(0.004)  (0.018)   (0.008)
- - -  -0.084  -  ∆ Capital 
  (0.146) 
- -  -0.006  -  -  ∆ Profitability 
  (0.035)  
N  255 255 255 255  255 
 
    Source: PIA-IBGE. 
     Note: Standard Errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) in brackets. 
 
 
The results for the 1990 to 1995 period are much less significant. This may be the result 
of the big changes in the macroeconomic environment surrounding the establishments, or driven 
by measurement errors in managers’ answers on conditions further in the past.  
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-0.112 0.053 0.022 -0.033  0.086  Rise in 
Density  (0.071)  (0.086) (0.050) (0.217)  (0.074)
-0.019 -0.051 -0.023 -0.045  0.122**  Decrease in 
Density  (0.056)  (0.067) (0.057) (0.153)  (0.063)
0.011 0.282 -0.024  -0.131  -0.078  Rise in local 
competition  (0.071)  (0.191) (0.049) (0.198)  (0.151)
0.088 0.221 0.056 -0.012  -0.112  Constant local 
competition  (0.072)  (0.187) (0.047) (0.201)  (0.152)
-0.084 0.298** -0.071  -0.394  -0.295**  Rise in Foreign 
competition  (0.119)  (0.089) (0.061) (0.325)  (0.105)
-0.064 0.368**  -0.145** -0.424  -0.326**  Constant 
Foreign  (0.118)  (0.111) (0.066) (0.312)  (0.110)
1.236 2.728** 1.236 7.153**  3.253**  ∆ Market share 
(1.320)  (0.958) (1.064) (2.758)  (0.758)
-0.002 - -0.042  0.276**  0.647**  ∆Employment 
(0.058)  (0.076) (0.135)  (0.088)
0.004 0.048**  -  -  0.000  ∆Capital/Sales 
(0.012)  (0.016)   (0.017)
- - -  0.089  -  ∆Capital 
  (0.071) 
- -  -0.438  -  -  ∆ Profitability 
  (0.357)  
N  221 221 221 221  221 
   Source: PIA-IBGE. 
   Note: Standard Errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) in brackets. 
 
5.4 The Introduction of Profit Sharing 
 
The managers of the establishments were also asked about the introduction of other industrial 
relation policies to improve the relationship between employees and managers so that 
productivity can rise.  The indicators used were the introduction of profit sharing, a program of 
“quality and productivity,” and increasing employees’ voice. In order to save space, the only 
results presented here are for profit sharing, the variable for which the results look most 
interesting. 
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0.123** 0.117  0.032 0.732**  0.086 




N 255  255  255  255  255 
Source: PIA-IBGE. 
Note: Standard Errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) in brackets; all controls of Table 9are also included. 
 
Table 11. Profit Sharing and Unionization, Long Differences: 1998-1995 










-0.070 0.071  -0.048  -0.785  0.002  Union Density 
(2000)  (0.086) (0.246)  (0.047)  (0.846)  (0.134) 
0.066 0.105  0.026  0.550**  0.071  Introduction of 
Profit Sharing  (0.050) (0.126)  (0.028)  (0.187)  (0.071) 
0.166 0.029  0.019  0.564  0.041  Profit Sharing * 
Union Density  (0.122) (0.306)  (0.066)  (0.739)  (0.170) 
N 255  255  255  255  255 
Source: PIA-IBGE. 
Note: Standard Errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) in brackets; all controls of Table 9 are also included. 
 
 
The results from Table 10 indicate that the introduction of profit sharing is associated 
with a rise in all performance indicators, with significant effects on profitability and value added, 
and imprecisely estimated impacts on employment and average wages.  The results must be 
interpreted with caution, however, since attributing a causal interpretation to this relationship 
requires a relatively strong assumption about the correlation between the introduction of profit 
sharing and the structure of the error term. 
The results from Table 11 indicate that the effects of the introduction of profit sharing 
may depend on degree of unionization in the establishment (Black and Lynch, 1997).  Columns 
(1) and (4) show that more unionized firms had a trajectory of lower profitability and 
productivity on average than less unionized ones, but that this was counter-weighted by the 
introduction of profit sharing, although interactive terms were not precisely estimated. One 
possible interpretation of the results is that profit sharing was introduced as a way to successfully 
  26counteract the decline in economic performance that took place in the more unionized 




The results of this paper indicate that unions seem to affect the economic performance of 
Brazilian establishments, especially in terms of profitability, employment and productivity. The 
results using the pooled sample indicate that unions tend to reduce profitability, whereas the 
relationship between union density and productivity, employment and average wages seems to 
be concave. These performance indicators first rise with union density up to a certain density 
level (usually about 50 percent) and then start to decline. These results indicate that some 
unionism may be good for plants’ economic performance, although too much unionism may start 
having negative effects. 
The profitability effect varies a great deal over time, especially before and after the 
hyperinflation period, but the union impacts on wage, employment and productivity are quite 
robust over time. Moreover, these effects are also captured in long-differences specifications, 
which use changes of unionization as explanatory variables to control for establishment fixed 
effects, with the exception of the union effect on wage. 
There is also evidence that the introduction of profit sharing schemes was associated with 
an improvement in performance, both in terms of productivity and profitability. Moreover, it 
seems that this effect was somewhat stronger in more unionized establishments, as compared to 
the less unionized ones. This may indicate that unions, by improving communication between 
managers and employees, make the introduction of profit sharing more efficient. Finally, 
unionized establishments that did not introduce new industrial relation policies experienced a 
downward trend in performance in the 1990s. 
 
  27References 
 
Amadeo, E.J., and V. Pero. 2000. “Adjustment, Stabilization and the Structure of Employment in 
Brazil.” Journal of Development Studies 36(4). 
Arbache, J. 1999. “Do Unions Always Decrease Wage Dispersion? The Case of Brazilian 
Manufacturing.” Journal of Labor Research 20(3): 425-36.  
Binmore, K. 1982. “Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models.” London, United Kingdom: 
London School of Economics. Mimeographed document. 
Binmore, K, A. Rubinstein and A. Wollinsky. 1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution in 
Economic Modeling.” Rand Journal of Economics 17: 176-88. 
Black, S., and L. Lynch. 1997. “How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and 
Information Technology on Productivity.” NBER Working Paper 6120. Cambridge, 
United States: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Blundell, R., and A. Bond. 1998. “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel 
Data Models.” Journal of Econometrics 87: 115-43. 
Bronars, S.G., and D.R. Deere. 1990. “Union Representation Elections and Firm Profitability.” 
Industrial Relations 29(1): 15-37. 
Davidson, C. 1988. “Multi-Union Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 6. 
Dobson, P. 1994. “Multi-Firm Unions and the Incentive to Adopt Pattern Bargaining in 
Oligopoly.” European Economic Review 38(1): 87-100. 
Dowrick, S. 1988. “Union-Oligopoly Bargaining.” Economic Journal 99: 1123-42. 
Driffill, J., and F. van der Poeg. 1995. “Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in 
Goods and Labor Markets.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: 223-243. 
Fallick, B., and K. Hassett. 1999. “Investment and Union Certification.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 17(3): 570-82. 
Gaston, N., and D. Tefler. 1995. “Union Wage Sensitivity to Trade and Protection: Theory and 
Evidence.” Journal of International Economics 39: 1-25. 
Gregg, P., S. Machi and D. Metcalf. 1993. “Signals and Cycles? Productivity Growth and 
Changes in Union Status in British Companies 1984-89.” Economic Journal 103: 894-
907. 
  28Hirsh, B. 1991. Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of US Firms. Kalamazoo, United 
States: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Grout, P. 1984. “Investment and Wage in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining 
Approach.” Econometrica 52(2): 449-60. 
MacDonald, I., and R. Solow. 1981. “Wage Bargaining and Employment.” American Economic 
Review 71: 896-908. 
Menezes-Filho, N. 1997. “Unions and Profitability in 1980s: Some Evidence on Union-Firm 
Bargaining in the UK.” Economic Journal 107(442): 651-670. 
Menezes-Filho, N., D. Ulph and J. Van Reenen. 1998. “R&D and Unionism: Comparative 
Evidence from British Companies and Establishments.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 52(1): 45-63. 
Mishel, L., and P. Voos. 1992. Unions and Economic Competitiveness. Armonk and New York, 
United States: M.E. Sharpe. 
Nash, J. 1953. “Two Person Cooperative Games.” Econometrica 21: 128-140. 
Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 50(1): 97-109. 
Stewart, M. 1990. “Union Wage Differentials, Product Market Influences and the Division of 
Rents.” Economic Journal 100(403): 1122-37. 
 




State:              ID: 
Phone:     Fax: 
Contact:            Position:    E-mail address: 
Sector of Activity  
 
============================================================= 
FIPE is undertaking a research to investigate the impact of trade unions on the economic 
performance of Brazilian Firms. The main aim is to verify the changes that may have taken place 
in the relationship between workers (trade unions) and firms after the trade liberalization process 
that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. You will notice that some of the questions refer 
to three points in time: 1988, 1995 and 2000. We realize that it may take some time and effort for 
you to check the data to reply accurately. We thank you for this and assure you that all 
information will be treated confidentially and that you will gain access to the final results from 




1.  When was this establishment set up? 
 
_before 1990 
_between 1990 and 1995 
_after 1995 
=========================================================== 
2.  How many employees did this establishment have in December 2000? 
=========================================================== 
3.  Between 1995 and 2000 (1990 and 1995) has the number of employees: 
 
_ declined 
_stayed the same 
_ risen 
=========================================================== 
4.  Is there direct negotiation between the managers and the union the represent the majority of 
workers in this establishment? 
=========================================================== 
5.  In 1995 (1990) was there direct negotiation between the managers and the union the 
represent the majority of workers in this establishment? 
=========================================================== 
6.  In December 2000, what percentage of employees were affiliated with trade unions? 
=========================================================== 
7.  Between 1995 and 2000  (1990-1995) the percentage of employees affiliated with unions: 
 
_ declined 
  30_stayed the same 
_ risen 
=========================================================== 
8.  How do you evaluate the power and influence of the trade unions that represent the workers 






_ very strong 
=========================================================== 
9.  Between 1995 and 2000  (1990-1995) the power and influence of the trade unions: 
 
_ declined 
_stayed the same 
_ risen 
=========================================================== 
10. Is there a workers’ council in this establishment? 
=========================================================== 
11. In 1995 (1990) Is there a workers’ council in this establishment? 
=========================================================== 
12. Does this establishment have a profit sharing scheme? 
 
_ no 
_yes, introduced between 1995 and 2000?    
=========================================================== 
13. Does this establishment have a “quality and productivity” scheme?   
_ no 
_yes, introduced between 1990 and 1995?    
_yes, introduced between 1995 and 2000?    
=========================================================== 
14. Does this establishment have a program to increase the “employees’ voice”?   
_ no 
_yes, introduced between 1990 and 1995?    
_yes, introduced between 1995 and 2000?    
=========================================================== 
15. How many direct competitors does this establishment face in the product market?   
 
_ none 
_ less than 5 
_ more than 5 
=========================================================== 
16. The competition from local producers between 1995 and 2000 (1990-1995) has: 
 
_ declined 
  31_ stayed the same 
_ risen 
=========================================================== 
17. The competition from foreign producers between 1995 and 2000 (1990-1995) has: 
 
_ declined 
_ stayed the same 
_ risen 
=========================================================== 
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